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The Limits of Federal Disability Law: State
Educational Voucher Programs
WENDY F. HENSEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a rare day in the United States that ends without a claim that some
governmental agency has exceeded its statutory authority, causing seri-
ous unintended consequences. Sometimes, the claim may potentially
even be true. Such is the case with the investigation by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) of the state of Wisconsin, and its adminis-
tration of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP),2 which pro-
vides low-income students with public money to attend private schools.'
Faced with complaints of disability discrimination by private schools
accepting voucher students, the DOJ has ordered Wisconsin to oversee
and police these schools to ensure their compliance with Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (Title 1I), 4 which applies to states and
their agencies, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504),, which applies to recipients of federal funding. Although
conditioning its directive on the state's coverage under these statutes, the
DOJ, in an unprecedented move, also strongly hinted that participating
schools may themselves be subject to Title H by accepting voucher stu-
*Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Georgia
State University College of Law. The author would like to thank Robert Garda, Paul Lombardo,
Laura Rothstein, and Mark Weber for their critique of earlier drafts of this article.
1. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, U.S. Dep't of Justice. Civil Rights Div., Educ.
Opportunities Section, to Tony Evers. State Superintendent, Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction (Apr.
9, 2013) (on file with ACLU), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/04 09 13_letter_
towisconsin dpio.pdf.
2. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2014).
3. See Tony Evers, Wisconsin Parental Choice Program Frequently Asked Questions-
2014-15 School Year, Wis. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION (2014), http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/
files/sms/pdf/2014-15_faqwpcp.pdf (expanding the Wisconsin program to allow participation
beyond Milwaukee; as a result, although the DOJ investigation refers to MPCP specifically, its
logic extends to the broader Wisconsin program).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2014).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2014).
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dents.6 If correct, this contradicts existing agency precedent, has signifi-
cant implications for states administering voucher programs, and may
impose burdens on private schools far beyond Wisconsin's borders.
So long as there are no constitutional or statutory impediments, there
is little doubt that a state may condition a private school's participation
in voucher programs on whatever basis it desires, including compliance
with federal antidiscrimination laws directed at the state. In fact, there
are compelling reasons why the state should do so. The question in the
Wisconsin investigation, however, is quite different-can a state be com-
pelled to do so by a federal agency? To what extent does federal law
require states to monitor and control, not only their own behavior in the
administration of state programs, but also those typically considered to
be private entities who participate in such programs? Complicating this
inquiry is the sensitive context in which it takes place-the education of
children with disabilities. This vulnerable population has routinely and
indisputably been the target of discrimination and diminished opportu-
nities in education. The ability to ensure equal access and opportunity
for these students is both compelling and critical as a matter of their civil
rights.
This article is a first step in evaluating the existing legal authority for
the DOJ's directives to Wisconsin and explores the broader question of
whether Title II and Section 504 obligations attach to the actions of pri-
vate schools participating in voucher programs. Part II of this article
details the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) and the current
investigation by the DOJ. Part HI briefly reviews the federal disability
laws at issue, while Part IV explores whether there is precedent to direct-
ly apply these laws to the private schools participating in voucher pro-
grams. Part V then asks whether the DOJ can hold states responsible for
the actions of private schools participating in voucher programs. Part VI
continues with an evaluation of a state's direct obligations under Title II
and Section 504. In light of the minimal precedent currently supporting
DOJ's directives in the Wisconsin investigation, this article concludes
that advocates of children with disabilities would be better served by
directly pressuring states to provide additional protection to children
with disabilities in their programs and challenging the public policy
question underlying it all-whether vouchers are ever beneficial for this
6. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1. at 3 n.3.
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population of students.7 Seeking federal intervention that relies on ques-
tionable legal authority diverts attention from the real issues at stake and
may delay the protections sought by disability advocates.
H. WISCONSIN LITIGATION
A. Milwaukee School Choice Program8
MPCP began in the 1990-1991 school year and has grown over time
to become one of the largest voucher programs in the United States. 9
MPCP is funded exclusively from the state treasury'0 and currently
includes 125 private schools, the majority of which are identifiably reli-
gious." More than 25,000 students participated in the program during
the 2013-2014 school year. 12
Students who reside within the city of Milwaukee and have a family
income of no more than three times the federal poverty level are eligible
to participate in the program." Participating private schools must accept
all students who apply during enrollment periods, unless they have more
applicants than seats available.' 4 Enrollees are then selected on a random
basis, although preference may be given for prior enrollees, siblings, and
prior MPCP participants." Upon acceptance, students are entitled to
7. See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special
Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291 (2010) (expressing concerns that voucher programs raise for
children with disabilities).
8. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2014).
9. Cecilia Elena Rouse & Lisa Barrow, School Vouchers and Student Achievement: Recent
Evidence, Remaining Questions, I ANN. REv. ECON. 17 (2009); Jay P. Greene & Ryan H. Marsh,
The Effect of Milwaukee's Parental Choice Program on Student Achievement in Milwaukee
Public Schools: SCDP Comprehensive Longitudinal Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program, Report #11, U. OF ARK., at I (Mar. 2009), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED530091 .pdf.
10. Russ Kava, Milwaukee and Racine Parental Choice Programs, Informational Paper 26,
Wis. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, at 1 (2013), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/
Informational-Papers/Documents/2013/26_Milwaukee%20and%20Racine% 20Parental%
20Choice%20Programs.pdf.
11. News Release, Wis. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 125 Schools Plans to Participate in
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, (Mar. 12, 2014), available at http://news.dpi.wi.gov/
files/eis/pdf/dpinr20l4_38.pdf.
12. Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: MCPC Facts and Figures for 2013-2014 as of
Mar 2014, Wis. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION (2014), http:l/sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/
imce/sms/pdf/mpcpfacts figures-2013-14.pdf.
13. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a) (West 2014).
14. Id. § 119.23(3)(a).
15. Id. § 119.23(3)(a)(1)-(3); see also WIs. ADMIN. CODE P1 § 35.04(1) (2014).
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receive state aid in an amount equal to the participating private school's
cost per pupil or a set amount determined by statutory formula, whichev-
er is less.16 The maximum award is less than half the per-pupil aid that
the Milwaukee Public Schools would have received for that student.1 7
Vouchers must be accepted as payment in full by participating schools
until the students reach high school, at which time additional fees may
be charged in some circumstances.'"
The state conditions private schools' participation in the program on
meeting basic administrative requirements. Private schools must be fis-
cally solvent, meet all health and safety laws applicable to private
schools, and employ teachers with a bachelor's degree or higher from an
accredited institution of higher education. 19 Schools also must be accred-
ited, or achieve accreditation, within three years of participating in the
program 0 and may not discriminate with respect to race, color, or nation-
al origin.', Schools are required to administer and report the results of
standardized testing to the state on a yearly basis."2 In order to maintain
eligibility under the program, they also must provide evidence that (a) at
least 70% of the MPCP students advanced at least one grade in the prior
year; (b) the school had an attendance rate of at least 90%; (c) at least
80% of the students demonstrated "significant academic progress;" and
(d) at least 70% of the families met parental involvement criteria estab-
lished by the school. 3 The state superintendent has the authority to ter-
minate the participation of any private school that does not comply with
these requirements.-4
It is notable that neither the statute nor the regulations relating to
MPCP refer to students with disabilities or the potential for disability
16. Id. § 119.23(4)(b)(4); see also Milwaukee FAQs, SCH. CHOICE WIS. (2014),
http://www.chooseyourscholwi.org/parent-info/milwaukee-parental-choice-program/milwaukee-
faqs.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (stating the maximum per-pupil amount for the 2014-2015
school year was $7,210 for grades K-8 and $7,856 for grades 9-12).
17. Common Myths in Parental Choice Program, SCH. CHOICE WIS..
http://www.schoolchoicewi.org/index.php/research/issues/misinformation/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2015).
18. Tony Evers, Parental Private School Choice Program (PPSCP-Racine) Frequently
Asked Questions-2013-2014 School Year, Wis. DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION (2013). available at
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sms/doc/ppscp-faq-2013-14.doc.
19. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a) (West 2014).
20. Id. § 119.23(2)(a)(7).
21. Id. § 119.23(2)(a)(4).
22. Id. § 119.23(6m)(b)(3).
23. Wis. AoDmI. CODE PI § 35.03(5) (2014).
24. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(7)(a) (West 2014); see also Wis. ADMIN. CODE PI § 35.05(12)
(2014).
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discrimination by private schools. The Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction (DPI), however, has stated that participating private schools
may not discriminate against children with disabilities in the admissions
process.Y Once a student is accepted, however, a school is only required
"to offer ... those services to assist students with special needs that it
can provide with minor adjustments. ' 26 DPI's public brochures about
MPCP urge parents to contact the private schools they are considering
for their special needs children to discuss "the services the school is able
to provide for their child," as well as their public school district to learn
about "the lesser services that the school district provides children with
special needs who are enrolled in private schools. 27
B. ACLU Complaint
In 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Foundation
Racial Justice Program, Disability Rights of Wisconsin, several parents,
and others filed a complaint with the DOJ claiming that MPCP and sev-
eral private schools participating in the program discriminate against
children with disabilities in violation of Section 504 and Title I.2 The
complaint contends that the state, through contractual arrangements, has
set up and maintained a segregated education system, either by intent or
effect, which excludes children with disabilities from voucher schools.
2 9
Because only 1.6% of those participating in the voucher program self-
report having a disability, versus 19.5% in public schools, complainants
conclude that the state has failed to provide meaningful access to its pro-
grams as required by federal law.,,,
The complaint also contends that private schools accepting vouchers
are subject to regulation directly under Section 504 because "the major-
25. Tony Evers, Milwaukee Parental Choice Program & Racine Parental Choice Program
Frequently Asked Questions-2015-16 School Year, Wis. DEP*T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION 3 (2015),
available at http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/ sites/defaultlfiles/imce/sms/Choice/MPCP%20and%
20RPCP%20FAQ%202015-16.pdf.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id.
28. See generally Complaint, ACLU v. Wisconsin (DOJ Civil Rights Division, filed on June
7, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/complaint-to-doj-re-milwaukee_
voucherprogranfinal.pdf (filing with the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, for the
presumed reason, that the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) does not have
jurisdiction over private schools participating in school choice programs; for letter stating that
OCR does not have jurisdiction over MPCP see Milwaukee (WI) Pub. Schs., 103 LRP 19640
(OCR 02/25/03)).
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 10.
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ity of voucher schools received Title I funded services through [the
Milwaukee Public School District] . .. [and] federal nutrition funding of
close to 9.7 million[.] ' 3 ' It asserts that voucher schools have violated
Section 504 by discouraging applications from this population and
refusing to provide reasonable accommodation to students with disabil-
ities once enrolled. 2 It goes further to argue that participating schools are
private in name only because several of the participating schools are
entirely comprised of students receiving public vouchers. As de facto
public institutions, "they ought to accept IDEA-eligible students and
provide them with appropriate services, at the same rate as public
schools."33
On August 17, 2011, DOJ responded to the complaint by filing a
request for information from DPI regarding the administration of its
voucher program. DPI's response repeatedly states that the schools par-
ticipating in MPCP are private entities that are not subject to Title II,
Section 504, or the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).14
In support of this position, DPI notes that the program is funded exclu-
sively with state funds," and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
specifically held that participating MPCP schools are private schools. 6
DPI was unable to provide much of the individual data on students with
disabilities that was requested by DOJ because "the statute governing
the MPCP neither authorizes DPI to request nor required MPCP to pro-
vide" such information.17
C. The Department of Justice's Response and Aftermath
On April 9, 2013, the DOJ issued a letter concluding that "DPI must
do more to enforce the federal statutory and regulatory requirements that
govern the treatment of students with disabilities who participate in the
31. Id. at 16-17 (nothing mentioning schools' obligations under Title III of the ADA because
the two identified private school respondents, Messmer Preparatory Catholic School and
Concordia University School, are religious entities and thus exempt from that statute).
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 28. See also id. at 6 (stating that twenty-two private schools were financed exclu-
sively by students in the voucher program).
34. Responses of State Superintendent Tony Evers and the Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction, to U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division Letter of August 17, 2011, at 2-4 (Questions 3, 4,
6, and 7), available at http://media.jsonline.com/documents/DPls-9-27-1 I -Responses.pdf.
35. Id. at 2 (Question 3).
36. Id. at 3-4 (Question 7) (citing Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998); Davis
v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992)).
37. Id. at 4 (Question 10).
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school choice program."3 DPI is compelled by Title II to ensure non-
discrimination and "cannot, by delegating the education function to pri-
vate voucher schools, place MPCP students beyond the reach of the fed-
eral laws that require Wisconsin to eliminate disability discrimination in
its administration of public programs."39 In relatively sweeping language,
the DOJ concludes that DPI is required to:
... ensure that its policies, practices and procedures governing the
program (1) empower students with disabilities and their parents to
make informed decisions during the school selection process; (2)
ensure that disability status has no unlawful adverse impact on
admissions decisions, and (3) ensure that voucher schools do not
discriminate against students with disabilities enrolled in the school,
either by denying those students opportunities and benefits available
to non-disabled students, or by failing to make reasonable modifi-
cations to school policies where ADA regulations apply to DPI or
participating schools. DPI is further obligated to collect accurate
information about all participating schools, fully inform the public
about the educational services and accommodations for persons
with disabilities available at participating schools, verify that adver-
tisements to potential enrollees are accurate, and ensure that the
services offered through the school choice program are provided in
a manner that does not discriminate on the basis of disability.
Finally, because DPI is charged with operating the school choice
program, it is responsible for monitoring and supervising the man-
ner in which participating schools serve students with disabilities.'
Notably, the DOJ does not directly address the ACLU's position that par-
ticipating private schools are themselves subject to regulation under Title
II or Section 504. In a footnote, however, the DOJ states that "[iln some
cases, private entities that contract or enter into other arrangements to
provide services under the auspices of a public program are also subject
to the nondiscrimination requirements that govern the program itself,
including but not limited to the specific requirements imposed by the
administering agency in accordance with Title II.'
4
1
38. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 3 n.3.
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On November 25, 2013, DPI responded to the DOJ's letter.42 DPI stat-
ed that it had no discriminatory policies or practices in place with respect
to the MPCP, but acknowledged that such practices could take place by
participant schools. Nevertheless, DPI questioned the scope of state and
federal authority to achieve the directives set forth by the DOJ. DPI
noted that its power to act under state law is limited to that which is
"expressly conferred or necessarily implied" from the relevant operating
statutes.43 The operative MPCP statute does not provide for the kind of
oversight and regulation of participant schools that would enable DPI to
ensure participant schools comply with federal disability laws.-
Moreover, Title II does not give the agency federal authority to take such
action or even to accept responsibility for the actions of private schools
because such actions "are not the result of requirements or policies
established by the DPI or state law."4
Despite these objections, DPI agreed to take some of the actions
ordered by the DOJ. In particular, it agreed to develop and publicize a
system allowing individuals to file complaints regarding disability dis-
crimination by participants in MPCP, although noting that state law only
permits DPI to address those complaints regarding disability discrimi-
nation in the admissions process.46 It also agreed to request some of the
information sought by the DOJ but denied it has the authority to compel
private schools to provide responses. 47 It further noted its concern that
DOJ's insistence that DPI secure this information from participant
schools is akin to "asking DPI to help the United States implement or
enforce the ADA against third parties," an action contrary to federal
law."
42. Letter from Janet Jenkins, Chief Legal Counsel, Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, to Renee
Wholenhaus, Educ. Opportunities Section, Civil Rights Div. (Nov. 25, 2013), available at
http://watchdog.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/blogs.dir/l/files/2014/04/DPI-Response-
dated-November-25-2013.pdf.
43. Id. at 2 (citing Brown Cnty. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 307 N.W.2d 247. 250 (Wis.
1981); Adams v. State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Bd., 342 Wis. 2d 444, 478 (2012)).
44. See id. at 2-3.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at4.
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 6.
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m. FEDERAL DISABILITY LAWS RELATING TO
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
What constitutes "discrimination" against students with disabilities is
defined by statute and varies significantly between private schools that
receive no public funds, those that do, and traditional public schools.49
Religious schools, moreover, are entirely exempt from regulation under
Title III of the ADA.", In light of these varying obligations, it is critical
to begin with an exploration of the parameters and coverage of the fed-
eral disability statutes that relate to students with disabilities.
A. Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to public enti-
ties, which includes "(a) any State or local government; [and] (b) any
department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State... or local
government."'" These entities are precluded from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities in the provision of any service,
program or activity. 2 An "individual with a disability who, with or with-
out reasonable modification to rules, policies, or practices, the removal
of architectural barriers . . . or the provision of auxiliary aids and serv-
ices, meets the essential eligibility requirements" of the program or serv-
ice at issue in spite of his or her disability is "qualified" within the mean-
ing of the statute."
More specifically, the regulations define discrimination to include
providing "an aid, benefit or service that is not as effective in affording
equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or
to reach the same level of achievement" as that provided to people out-
side of the protected class.- A public entity may not engage in such dis-
49. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, to OCR
Staff. 22 IDELR 669 at *7 (Jul. 27, 1990) (noting that the question of what constitutes discrimi-
nation by participant schools changes significantly depending on characterization of the school).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2014).
51.42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2014).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2014). A qualified individual with a disability is one who meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or activ-
ities sponsored by the public entity with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12131 (2014).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2014). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2015); Se. Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397,406 (1979) (holding that an "otherwise qualified person" is one who is capa-
ble of meeting all program requirements "in spite of his handicap").
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(iii) (2015).
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crimination either "directly or through contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements."5 The regulations also prohibit the imposition or applica-
tion of "eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an indi-
vidual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from
fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, unless such
criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service,
program, or activity being offered.""i Providers must make reasonable
modifications to policies for this group where necessary to avoid dis-
crimination unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the
good, service or program being provided. 7
Because Title II applies only to state and local public entities, DOJ not
surprisingly has no regulations addressing the application of this statute
to private schools serving the K-12 population. In contrast, Section 504
regulations specifically address the statute's applicability to both public
schools and private schools receiving public funds. Because Congress
has directed that Title II regulations be parallel to and interpreted con-
sistently with those developed under the Rehabilitation Act, the prece-
dent and regulations developed under Section 504 are equally applicable
to Title fl.u
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act5 9
The precursor to the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act con-
tains the general provision that "no otherwise qualified individual with a
disability.., shall, solely by reason of her or his disability," be discrim-
inated against in any program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance., Federal financial assistance includes "any grant, loan, con-
tract . . . or any other arrangement by which the Department [of
Education] provides or otherwise makes available assistance in the form
of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal personnel; or (3) Real or personal
55. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i), (iii) (2015).
56. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2015). Notably, even criteria that "indirectly prevent or limit"
the ability to people with disabilities to participate or benefit from a service are precluded by the
regulation. 28 C.F.R. § 35 App. B (2015).
57. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2015).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2014); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,
588-92 (1999).
59. The question of whether any of the private schools that participate in MPCP are actual-
ly covered by Section 504 is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of argument, the
author assumes that at least some participating schools have accepted federal funding and are
subject to the provisions of Section 504.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2014).
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property or any interest in the use of that property .... If such assis-
tance is present, Section 504 extends to "all of the operations" of the
entity that receives the assistance. Private schools most commonly
would be covered by funding received through the National School
Lunch Program1 or Title I programs. 4 Religious entities receiving fed-
eral funds are included within this mandate.65
Section 504 regulations impose significantly different obligations on
public and private schools. Public schools are required to provide a free,
appropriate public education to each child with a disability in their juris-
diction 6 Students are provided with significant procedural protections,
including the right to an impartial hearing when disagreements arise
between the schools and parents." Public schools also must provide spe-
cial education services in an integrated setting to the maximum extent
appropriate to the child's needs.68 As a result of the expansive definition
of disability adopted by Congress in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
some commentators have speculated that Section 504 now has the poten-
tial to provide protection that is equal or potentially superior to that pro-
vided to students with disabilities under the IDEA.69
In contrast, Section 504 regulations directed at covered private
schools, when coupled with relevant judicial precedent, afford more lim-
ited protection to students with disabilities. As the Supreme Court
explained in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, "nothing in the
[Rehabilitation Act] requires an educational institution to lower its stan-
dards."7 Instead, private schools may establish selective admissions cri-
teria when such criteria are based on legitimate academic policies.1
61. 34 C.ER. § 104.3(h) (2015).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1) (2014).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769(j) (2014).
64. See, e.g., Hunt v. St. Peter Sch., 963 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (parochial
school covered by Section 504 for receipt of services under Title I).
65. Id. at 849; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(l) (2014).
66. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2015).
67. 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2015).
68. 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2015).
69. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Procedures and Remedies Under Section 504 and the ADA for
Public School Children with Disabilities, 32 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 611,615 (2012)
(quoting Perry A. Zirkel, Does Section 504 Require a Section 504 Plan for Each Eligible Non-
IDEA Student?. 40 J.L. & EDuc. 407, 414 (2011)) (explaining that the award of a 504 plan. for-
merly considered the "consolation prize" to those denied eligibility under the IDEA, is becom-
ing "the prize itself').
70. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,413 n.12 (1979).
71. St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 167-73 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding private school's
refusal to admit student with disabilities where student did not perform at or above grade level).
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Private schools may not exclude qualified students with disabilities who
"can, with minor adjustments, be provided an appropriate education...
within [the school's] program, ' 72 but they need not "provide an appro-
priate education to ... students [with disabilities] with special educa-
tional needs if [they] do not offer programs designed to meet those
needs.7 3 Notably, although the ACLU complaint equates "minor adjust-
ments" with "reasonable accommodations," there is some precedent
indicating that these standards are not equivalents. For example, one
court reasoned that "[m]inor indicates a minimal burden and adjustment
implies a small correction," which is something less than reasonable
accommodation.4 Even for those students with disabilities who are
admitted, there is no requirement that participating schools develop an
IEP or ensure adequate educational progress.75
C. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
All non-religious private schools are covered as "public accommoda-
tions" under Title HI of the ADA, 76 and as such, are precluded from dis-
criminating on the basis of disability.77 This prohibition requires private
schools to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices and pro-
cedures where such modifications are necessary for students with dis-
abilities and do not represent a fundamental alteration of the academic
program.7 Title 1I also precludes private schools from refusing to allow
a qualified student with a disability to participate in their programs or
imposing unnecessary eligibility requirements that tend to screen out
such students. 79 To ensure inclusion, private schools must provide auxil-
72. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (2015); see also Letter from Susan Bowers, Acting Deputy
Secretary for Civil Rights & Patricia J. Guard, Acting Director, Office of Special Education
Programs, to John W. Bowen, School Board Attorney, 35 IDELR 129, at *2 (Mar. 30, 2001) (cita-
tion omitted).
73. Letter from Susan Bowers, supra note 72 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104, App. A, at 28).
74. See Hunt v. St. Peter Sch., 963 F. Supp. 843, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1997); see generally Lynn
M. Daggett, "Minor Adjustments" and Other Not-So-Minor Obligations: Section 504, Private
Religious K-12 Schools, and Students with Disabilities, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 301 (2014)
(discussing the "minor adjustments" standard).
75. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, supra note 49, at *9.
76.42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (2014) (identifying "nursery, elementary, secondary... or other
place of education" as a public accommodation); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (2015). See also Marshall
v. Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605-06 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted) (noting Title III's exemption of parochial schools is "broad").
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2014).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2014).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2014).
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iary aids and services where necessary to facilitate communication with
students with disabilities, and architectural barriers must be removed
where it is readily achievable to do so. °
Notably, Title Ell specifically precludes administrative methods that
have a disparate impact on people with disabilities.81 Public accommo-
dations, directly or through contractual arrangements, are prohibited
from employing "standards or criteria or methods of administration that
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability, or that per-
petuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common admin-
istrative control. 8 2
Although these general protections are not insignificant, Title II's
impact is limited. The statute does not require private schools to devel-
op or implement individualized education plans"' or offer the procedural
guarantees extended by the IDEA or Section 504.1
IV. THE DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF TITLE II AND
SECTION 504 TO PRIVATE VOUCHER SCHOOLS
The state's coverage under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA is
clear, as is the requirement that state agencies cannot discriminate
against students with disabilities in the development or administration of
voucher programs.85 Private schools that accept federal monetary assis-
tance are also directly covered under the provisions of Section 504. The
DOJ's position however, could be read to imply that private schools may
be transformed into public entities directly subject to both statutes sim-
ply by virtue of their participation in voucher programs. 6 This assertion
has little precedential support.
The majority of courts to have considered the issue have concluded
that private actors are not state instrumentalities for purposes of Title II
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv) (2014).
81. See 28 C.F.R. § 36, App. C ("Section 36.204 Administrative Methods") (2014) (stating
that Section 36.204 "incorporate[s] a disparate impact standard to ensure the effectiveness of the
legislative mandate to end discrimination"). See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
299-300 (1985).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 36.204 (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(D) (2014).
83. See Letter from John L. Wodatch, 9 N.D.L.R. 42, 1-2 (May 2, 1996); see also Bercovitch
v. Baldwin Sch. Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 152-53 (1st Cir.1998).
84. See Letter from John L. Wodatch, supra note 83.
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(a) (2015).
86. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 3 n.3.
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even if they perform government functions pursuant to state contracts.8 7
They reason that "instrumentality" is not self-defining, and its meaning
must be derived by reference to the terms which surround it in the
statute, such as "department," "agency," and "special purpose district."8'
From this canon of interpretation, courts have concluded that a state
instrumentality is "a creature of a state or municipality"8 or a "govern-
mental unit... created by them."0 Entities that "exercise no significant
element of public governance," such as private universities, are typical-
ly excluded from this definition.91 By the same reasoning, the minimal
regulation imposed on private schools participating in the voucher pro-
gram would be insufficient to transform these entities into state instru-
mentalities for purposes of Title H.
The conclusion that the state has contracted with the private schools in
the voucher program is itself questionable. The U.S. Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) reviewed MPCP in 1990 and
specifically concluded that the program "does not appear to involve or
contemplate a contractual relationship between the State Educational
Agency (SEA) or Local Education Agency (LEA) and the private
schools,"92 reasoning that "parents are the operative decision makers and
no LEA participation is involved." 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion when evaluating whether MPCP's inclu-
sion of religious schools in its program violated the U.S. Constitution's
Establishment Clause?' The court concluded that the program did not
87. Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2006) (hospital not public enti-
ty under Title II even when it "carrie[s] out a public function pursuant to a contract with the City,
in accord with City rules, and under the direction of City employees"); Edison v. Douberly, 604
F.3d 1307, 1310 (1 th Cir. 2010) (prison management corporation operating state prison not pub-
lic entity "merely by contracting with the State to provide governmental services, essential or oth-
erwise"); Medina v. Valdez. No.04-1006-cv, 2011 WL 887553, at *3, *6 (D. Idaho Mar. 10, 2011)
(" . . . nearly every district court confronting the issue has held that a private entity does not
become a public entity by providing services to a contract with the state"); O'Connor v. Metro
Ride, Inc., 87 E Supp. 2d 894, 900 (D. Minn. 2000) ("Plaintiffs have cited no case, and this court
is not aware of one, finding that a private, for-profit corporation-even one that contracts with a
public entity-could be subject to liability under Title I").
88. See Green, 465 F3d at 79.
89. Id.
90. Edison, 604 F.3d at 1310.
91. Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services and Activities Accessible to All, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 389, 395 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
92. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, supra note 49, at *6.
93. Id.
94. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wis. 1998).
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result in excessive entanglement with the state because the state "need
not, and in fact is not given the authority to impose a 'comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance' over the participating
sectarian private schools."' The court was not persuaded that the per-
formance, reporting, and auditing requirements for private schools were
of significance in this regard. It concluded that such oversight was "min-
imal" and already existed in any event, as the Superintendent "currently
monitors the quality of education at all sectarian private schools."9 The
court found it significant that MPCP "does not involve the State in any
way with the schools' governance, curriculum, or day-to-day affairs."
There likewise is little support for the belief that private schools'
receipt of state funding through enrolled students transforms these pri-
vate schools into public actors. The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifi-
cally addressed this issue in 1992 when it first evaluated the status of pri-
vate schools participating in the MPCP program. In Davis v. Grover, the
MPCP was challenged as violating Wisconsin's constitutional require-
ment that the legislature "'provide by law for the establishment of dis-
trict schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable .... "9
The court found it significant that MPCP's authorizing statute refers to
"private schools," a statutory term of art in Wisconsin." Although
acknowledging the private schools received public funds as a result of
the program, it held that such funding was not sufficient to transform pri-
vate schools into public district schools.'" The court reaffirmed this con-
clusion six years later in Jackson.10' The court found it highly significant
that the state maintained a completely operational public school system
throughout the voucher program's existence, and students at all times
retained the option of attending public schools.'0 2
Federal agency decisions are consistent with this line of precedent.
OCR, in considering MPCP, was not convinced that public school status
was bestowed upon the participating private schools by virtue of their
95. Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 620.
98. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Wis. CONST. art. X. § 3).
99. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 473.
100. Id. at 474.
101. Jackson v. Benson. 578 N.W.2d 602, 627 (Wis. 1998).
102. Id. at 628. Of course, state cases would not control the interpretation of whether a con-
tract was present for purposes of Title II or Section 504. both federal statutes. Nevertheless, the
reasoning provides insight into how courts have perceived the relationship between the state and
schools that participate in voucher programs.
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receipt of state funds.103 Instead, the agency found it highly significant that
parents, rather than the state, determined where the state funds would
flow by electing where to enroll their children. OCR contrasted this
action with private placement determinations made by an IEP team,
which transform a private school into the public mechanism whereby an
LEA meets its federal obligations.'" The agency restated this conclusion
in 200111 in the context of Florida's McKay Scholarship, the largest
voucher program directed exclusively at students with disabilities.' °' It
found that when a voucher program is funded solely by state funds,
"[f]ederal civil rights laws, including Section 504, do not directly apply
to the private schools participating in the Scholarship Program. Further,
Title II of the ADA does not directly apply, as the private schools are not
public entities."", OCR has even declined to consider a complaint of
racial discrimination brought under Title VI against a private school par-
ticipating in MPCP on the grounds that it lacked the jurisdiction to do so.
OCR based its finding on the fact that MPCP was not a program operat-
ed by the Milwaukee public schools, °8 and the private school "d[id] not
receive funds from the Department and is not a public entity."0
Notably, private schools are not directly governed by the IDEA even
when they contract with a school district to provide FAPE to a special
education student."10 Instead, the private school is governed by those laws
directly applicable to it, and the state remains responsible for enforce-
ment and compliance with the federal directives at all times.' As the
Second Circuit clarified, "IDEA's implementing rules reinforce the prin-
ciple that IDEA applies only to the State and other public agencies, not
to private schools in which public agencies may place children."' 12 If a
103. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, supra note 49, at *4, *6.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Letter from Susan Bowers, supra note 72, at *2.
106. See FLA. STAr. ANN. § 1002.39 (West 2014).
107. Letter from Susan Bowers, supra note 72, at *2.
108. Letter from Madonna T Lechner, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, Midwestern
Div., Chi., to [ 103 LRP 196470, *1 (Feb. 25, 2003).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., K.H. v. Vincent Smith Sch.. 45 IDELR 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). If there is a con-
tractual arrangement between the school and the parent, the parent may have standing to enforce
the private school's compliance with the contract.
111. Id. See also St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that pri-
vate high school's placement decisions were not controlled by the IDEA even when LEA paid for
student's tuition). Although the language of Section 504 and Title II would control this outcome
rather than the language of the IDEA, this division of responsibility and liability sheds light on
the same in the context of voucher programs.
112. K.H., 45 IDELR, at *7.
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direct placement by a public agency does not trigger federal statutes
intended for the state, it is unlikely that acceptance of voucher money
directed by parents would do so.
Parallels can be drawn, albeit imperfectly, to cases in which vouchers
have been challenged under the U.S. Constitution's Establishment
Clause. In Zehnan v. Simmons-Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that publicly funded school choice programs are consistent with the
Establishment Clause so long as the program is the product of "true pri-
vate choice."'' 3 The Court reasoned that when parents select the learning
environment for their children, "the circuit between government and
religion [is] broken" despite the existence of state funding for educa-
tion."4 An analogy could be drawn that parents, rather than the state, dic-
tate whether or not to participate in MPCP and where to apply for admis-
sion, such that private voucher schools likewise do not become agents of
the state upon receipt of voucher funding.
The Complainants in the DOJ investigation acknowledged this line of
precedent but argued that it is inapposite because of the quantitative
expansion of voucher programs since the decisions were rendered."'
They contend that because many MPCP participating schools are now
comprised of all or a majority of students receiving public vouchers, the
scope of public funding transforms these institutions into de facto pub-
lic entities."" Similar arguments, however, have been rejected in state
and federal courts. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jackson made
explicit that its conclusion finding voucher schools to be private "is not
affected by the amount of public funds a private school receives."' ' 17
When considering a related issue, the U.S. Supreme Court in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn"" found that a private school was not transformed into a
state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment simply because
90% of the students attending the school were referred and funded by the
public entities."19 In the context of the Establishment Clause, moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held "that the amount of govern-
ment aid channeled to religious institutions by individual aid recipients
113. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
114. Id. at 652.
115. Complaint, supra note 28, at 27-28.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 627 (Wis. 1998).
118. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
119. Id. at 832.
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[i]s not relevant to the constitutional inquiry."'20 The operative analysis
does not "rest[] on whether few or many recipients chose to expend gov-
ernment aid at a [particular] religious school, but, rather, on whether
recipients generally were empowered to direct the aid to schools or insti-
tutions of their own choosing. 2' Although a distinction can obviously be
made between Constitutional law and the statutory interpretation of a
Title II or Section 504 case, the courts' focus on parental involvement as
the determinant factor certainly suggests that the quantity of funding will
not determine whether private schools are transformed into public actors
for purposes of federal regulation.
V. STATES' LIABILITY UNDER TITLE II & SECTION 504
FOR THE BEHAVIOR OF PARTICIPATING PRIVATE
SCHOOLS 12
Title II's extension to "any service, program or activity" of the state is
generally construed broadly to include "anything that a public entity
does" and encompasses the administration of the state's voucher pro-
gram.123 Moreover, a public entity, in providing an aid, benefit or service,
may not contract away its liability under Title I.124 Notably, however,
120. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002).
121. Id. (discussing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 at 490-91
(1986)). It is worth noting, moreover, that the MPCP survived a challenge under the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution in part because of the court's finding that the program
did not create an "excessive entanglement between the State and religion." In reaching this con-
clusion, the court found it critical that the state did not have the authority to impose 'a compre-
hensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' over the participating sectarian private
school." Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)). It
is possible that the degree of state oversight of participating schools mandated by DOJ would cre-
ate the "detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious bod-
ies" sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 620
(citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989)).
122. It is worth noting up front that this section does not discuss whether DOJ's actions con-
stitute commandeering in violation of the Tenth Amendment, an argument made by some critics
of DOJ's approach in Wisconsin. Commandeering occurs when the federal government requires
state officials to "enact, administer, or enforce a federal regulatory program." Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1630
(2006). This complex Constitutional argument is beyond the scope of this article.
123. Bay Area Addiction Research Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F3d 725, 732 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing 28 C.FR. § 35, App. A. at 438 (1998)).
124. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2011); Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058,
1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010).
[Vol. 44, No. 2
The Limits of Federal Disability Law 217
"'the scope of Title II is not limitless. ' 1" 25 The DOJ's directive to "mon-
itor[] and supervise[] the manner in which participating schools serve
students with disabilities"'2-6 to ensure Title H compliance essentially
requires the state to impose Title II standards on participating private
schools. This unprecedented position would result in a significant expan-
sion of federal authority unsupported by law.
When MPCP was first enacted, some advocates argued that the state
retained its obligation to ensure that participating children received the
full range of services that EHA, the IDEA's predecessor, requires for stu-
dents with disabilities in public schools. If correct, the state necessarily
would be obligated either to provide such services directly or to require
private schools to provide them as a condition of participating in the
voucher program. Although acknowledging that "[t]hese constitute
exceedingly difficult issues of first impression for the Department,"
OCR concluded no such obligation was created by voucher programs.' 2
The agency reasoned that children are "parentally placed" at private
schools upon parental acceptance of a voucher and are no longer public
school students under the EHA.'28 As a result, the state's obligation was
limited to providing the "equitable services" available to all private stu-
dents under EHA but not to providing the free appropriate public educa-
tion to children under the statute.'2 9 Although OCR acknowledged that
the state was partially subsidizing the education of voucher students, the
agency concluded that did not translate into a public agency placement
under the statute because parents act as the "key decisionmaker[s]"
rather than the IEP team. 3" Notably, OCR fiever suggested that federal
law required the state to monitor or control the services provided by the
private schools to the students with disabilities in voucher schools.
The agency addressed this point more directly in 2001 in the context
of the McKay Scholarship.'3 ' Although acknowledging that Title I and
Section 504 clearly cover the SEA's actions, OCR concluded that the
state would meet this obligation in the context of a voucher program by
125. Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 687 F.3d 63, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Reeves v. Queen City Transp., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (D. Colo. 1998)).
126. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 3.
127. Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, supra note 49, at *2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id.
131. See Letter from Susan Bowers, supra note 72.
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ensuring that participating private schools do not exclude participant
children with disabilities "'if the person can, with minor adjustments, be
provided an appropriate education within the school's program,"'" 2 the
standard articulated under Section 504 as applied to private schools. The
opinion concluded that the SEA need not "ensure that the participating
private schools 'provide an appropriate education ... to students [with
disabilities] with special educational needs if [the participating private
schools do] not offer programs designed to meet those needs."' "33 These
standards, while not insignificant, would seem less intrusive than DOJ's
wholesale requirement that DPI "monitor and supervise" essentially all
aspects of "the manner in which participating schools serve students
with disabilities."'' M
There is some analogous precedent, moreover, which suggests that
states are not required under Title H or Section 504 to ensure that vouch-
er schools comply with these statutes in order for states to meet their fed-
eral obligations. In Liberty Resources, Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority, an interest group brought suit against the Philadelphia
Housing Authority (PHA) claiming its Housing Choice Voucher
Program discriminated against mobility-impaired individuals in viola-
tion of Title II and Section 504.115 The program provided vouchers to
low-income families to help subsidize the rental of privately-owned
units.36 Notably, the program was established through Section 8 of the
U.S. Housing Act,'37 and was a direct recipient of federal funds, unlike
Wisconsin's educational voucher program. PHA adopted a number of
requirements for landlords to receive voucher tenants, which included
completing paperwork, undergoing a property inspection to determine
compliance with HUD standards, and correcting any substandard defi-
ciencies.'38 In addition, PHA and participating landlords agreed upon the
monthly rent for the property, and landlords new to the program were
required to pay a fee and to attend a property management course.3 9
However, PHA did not require participating landlords to make their
properties compliant with Title I's accessibility standards.""0
132. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a)).
133. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104, App. A. at 28) (brackets in original).
134. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 3.
135. Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 528 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
136. Id. at 556.
137. Id. at 558. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2014).
138. Liberty Res., hc., 528 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 559-60.
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The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the voucher program
provided an unequal benefit to people with disabilities in violation of
Title II and Section 504 by virtue of an inadequate supply of accessible
housing. The court, focusing on the state's behavior rather than the pri-
vate actors, reasoned that the appropriate inquiry under federal law was
whether the state had provided meaningful access to the benefits of the
program.' The court concluded that so long as the state had provided
evenhanded treatment to all voucher applicants and did not deny access
to the program, the fact that fewer individuals with disabilities secured
housing through the program did not violate federal law. The court fur-
ther opined that "it is difficult to imagine that equal results are attainable
since.., the plaintiff is asking ... the public entity responsible for [the
voucher program] to resolve a difficulty experienced by disabled people
that is the result of the actions of private individuals."'4 2 Notably, the
court did not suggest that the state's failure to require private landlords
to comply with Title H or Section 504 was itself a violation of the law.
Instead, it held that because the public agency "is not responsible and
cannot control the actions of private landlords[,] ... [it] cannot be held
to violate the ADA and RA for the failure of the private rental market to
provide voucher holders with a sufficient number of accessible units.'143
Although distinguishable because determined in the context of housing,
the case nevertheless suggests that federal law does not compel DPI to
ensure that participating private schools comply with Title 11 standards.
Courts in other contexts have likewise reasoned that Title II "cannot
be read to impose strict liability on public entities that neither caused
plaintiffs to be excluded nor discriminated against them. A remedy
unmoored to any finding of fault is not a remedy at all .... ."'4 In Bacon
v. City of Richmond, Virginia, plaintiffs sought to force the City of
Richmond to pay to make the school buildings within its district acces-
sible to students with disabilities. 1'45 Although the city delegated the
amount of capital funding to the schools, the school board had exclusive
control over capital improvement projects and over the budget general-
ly. The Court was not persuaded that the City's role in funding schools
created liability under Title H finding it significant that the City neither
141. Id. at 568.
142. Id. at 569 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 570.
144. Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 E3d 633, 639-40 (4th Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 636.
Spring 2015]
220 Journal of Law & Education
exercised operational control over the school buildings nor determined
how the allocated funds were spent.'1 As a result, "[t]o impose ... lia-
bility.., places the City between a rock and a hard place: The City must
'ensure that the City schools become ADA-compliant within [five
years],' but is powerless to control the expenditure of school funds. 147
The court found the context in which the case arose to be particularly
significant:
Federal courts must tread with especial caution where, as here, a
State's paramount interest in educating its children is at stake. Local
control over the operation of public schools is one of our nation's
most deeply rooted traditions- and for good reason.
To make funding entities responsible for the statutory violations of
funding recipients would stretch the contours of Title II. Title II does
not contemplate funding liability for an independent public entity
that neither controls the challenged services nor discriminated
against plaintiffs because of disability. It does not impose guarantor
liability or make funding entities ADA insurers for funding recipi-
ents. To the contrary, the plain text of Title 11 limits responsibility to
public entities that discriminate against or exclude persons with dis-
abilities from the services .... To hold that a city or State by virtue
of its funding authority is liable for injury caused solely by a sepa-
rate and independent corporate body is a novel and unprecedented
theory. 148
The Court reasoned that a contrary position would likely discourage pro-
gram funding, because the state would be "compelled to anticipate every
conceivable liability."'4 9 Moreover, "an inordinate amount of red tape
would be generated while experts and actuaries calculated the risks
involved in the operation of local schools."'5
Similar reasoning has been articulated by the Supreme Court when
evaluating whether state action was present for the purposes of imposing
liability under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Blum v.
Yaretsky, the Court reasoned that "a State normally can be held respon-
146. Id. at 640-41.
147. Id. at 641.
148. Id. at 641-42.
149. Id. at 643.
150. Id.
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sible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or
has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"'' The Court
reiterated that receiving public funding by itself does not transform a pri-
vate actor's decision into an act of the State.'52 Although the ADA obvi-
ously distinguishes between state action and public entity action, courts
have found that the former is "susceptible to broader interpretation."'153
Thus, if state action is not present for Fourteenth Amendment purposes,
it is also unlikely to be found in the related Title II context.
DOJ seemingly ignores this precedent in concluding that DPI "has the
authority and obligation under Title II to take the appropriate steps in its
enforcement of program requirements to prohibit discrimination ...
regardless of whether services are delivered directly by a public entity or
provided through a third party.'1 4 It cites a number of cases where courts
have held states liable under Title II for the actions of private actors
undertaken by contract. For a number of reasons, these cases appear to
have little, if any, applicability to voucher programs.
Of most significance, the cases cited by DOJ primarily involve exten-
sive contracts between the state and private actors to provide govern-
mental services directly to individuals with disabilities. In Armstrong v.
Schwarzenegger, for example, prisoners housed in county jails pursuant
to an explicit contract with the state challenged the facilities' lack of
compliance with Title II standards. 55 In Kerr v. Heather Gardens
Association, a woman with hearing impairments brought a Title II chal-
lenge against a public district in Colorado that contractually delegated
all authority to manage and operate a senior living center to the local
homeowner's association. 56 James v. Peter Pan Transit Management,
Inc. likewise involved a contract between City of Raleigh and a private
transport company to manage a public transportation system for the
City.'5 7 At no time in these cases did the states argue that no contracts
existed, or that the contracts did not provide for significant control over
private actors as is the case in the Wisconsin investigation. To the con-
151. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
152. See id. at 1012 (White, J., concurring) (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
840 (1982)).
153. See Medina v. Valdez, No.04-1006-cv, 2011 WL 887553, at *4 (D. Idaho Mar. 10,
2011).
1.54. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 2.
155. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010).
156. Kerr v. Heather Gardens Assoc., 2010 WL 3791484, at *1 (D. Colo. 2010).
157. James v. Peter Pan Transit Mgmt., Inc., 1999 WL 735173, at *2 (E.D. N.C. 1999).
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trary-the states argued that the contracts were so extensive that they
constituted a complete delegation of state authority and thereby Title II
liability to the private entity."' The courts correctly rejected this argu-
ment, noting the clear line of precedent and authority establishing that a
state may not avoid its Title II obligations by contracting them out to pri-
vate actors.' 59 These cases do not extend to MPCP, however, because
there are no contractual arrangements between DPI and private schools.
Instead, DPI provides public funds directly to individual students with
disabilities who elect whether and where to enroll.
The one exception to this reasoning cited by DOJ is Disability
Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, ° a case that later was vacated on appeal.
There, an advocacy organization sued the state on behalf of adults with
disabilities living in state-licensed private group homes on the grounds
that the homes unnecessarily segregated people with disabilities in vio-
lation of Title 11's integration mandate. The state argued that Title II did
not apply because the complained of actions were taken by private group
homes rather than the state. 6' They also argued that Title II did not apply
because "'the State does not require that anyone live in adult homes or
receive services in adult homes,"' and as such, the residents could
remove themselves at any time.' 62 In finding Title II to be applicable, the
Court noted that the state, "and no other entit[y], [is] responsible for
determining what services to provide, in what settings to provide them,
and how to allocate funds for each program.' 6 As a result of this exten-
158. See Armstrong, 622 F.3d at 1066 (state argued that its contract with the county dele-
gated its responsibilities under Title II to the county); Kerr, 2010 WL 3791484. at *6 (arguing
that district "delegated the provision of services, programs and activities to the Association, and
therefore, it is not liable under Title II for the actions that the Association takes in performing
these duties."); James, 1999 WL 735173, at *8 ("[The City] contends that it satisfied its ADA
obligations by providing in its contract with Peter Pan that Peter Pan must comply with all ADA
requirements that would be imposed on the City if it operated the CAT Connector system.").
159. See Armstrong, 622 F.3d at 1066-68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (2010): Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997);
H.R. Rep. No. 101 -485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 51 (1990)); Kerr,
2010 WL 3791484, at *8-*9 (citing Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, *4-*5 (9th
Cir. 2010), 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. A (2010)); James, 1999 WL 735173, at *9 (citing CiviL RIGHTS
DiviSION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE. AMERICANs wiTH DIsABILITuES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL 1ll-1.7000 7 (1993)). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l) (2015).
160. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (vacated
sub nom. Disability Adiv, Inc. v. N. Y Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2012)).
161. Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18.
162. Id. at 318 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 319.
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sive statutory and regulatory scheme, the fact that the group homes were
private did not relieve the state of its obligations under Title II.164
As is apparent, there is no state involvement in private schools partici-
pating in the voucher system that remotely rises to the level cited in
Paterson. As discussed earlier, OCR has specifically concluded in the past
that there is no contract between DPI and participating private schools.'6 -
Although the agency has the obvious authority to reconsider this position,
it has made no move to do so, and such a change would likely call into
question its repeated position that parents are the operative decision mak-
ers in private school voucher programs. The state's imposition of minimal
regulatory requirements on private schools simply does not equate with a
state's delegation of the prison function, public transportation, the whole-
sale operation of community center, or the comprehensive regulatory and
funding scheme for mental health services. To find otherwise would trans-
form numerous private entities subjected to governmental regulation into
governmental actors for purposes of federal law.
In some respects, the relationship between DPI and participating pri-
vate schools may best be compared to a licensing program. Private
schools must comply with minimal regulatory requirements in order to
participate in the voucher program, just as meeting certain state-mandat-
ed standards typically permits an applicant to receive a state license to
engage in a regulated activity. Federal regulations prohibit a public enti-
ty from administering a license or certification program "in a manner that
subjects qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the
basis of disability .... "6 This relationship, however, is intended to pro-
tect the licensee rather than third parties who may be discriminated
against by these entities. As DOJ's regulations make clear, "[t]he pro-
grams or activities of entities that are licensed or certified by a public
entity are not, themselves, covered by [Title H]."167 As a result, "[t]he State
is not accountable for discrimination in the employment or other prac-
tices of [the licensee], if those practices are not the result of requirements
or policies established by the State."'6 By the same token, one could con-
164. Id. at 317-18.
165. See infra Part IV.
166. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (2015).
167. Id.
168. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
TITLE If TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 11-3.7200. See also Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine
Comm'n, 687 F.3d at 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that that state's licensing of taxi cabs did not
subject it to Title II liability for private taxi industry's potential failure to provide meaningful
access to individuals with disabilities).
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clude that federal law does not require Wisconsin to impose and police
Title I standards on private schools engaged in the voucher program.
VI. WISCONSIN'S LIABILITY UNDER TITLE II AND
SECTION 504 IN OPERATING VOUCHER PROGRAMS
The remaining question, then, is whether Wisconsin has violated Title
II or Section 504 in its own right in the administration of its voucher pro-
gram such that DOJ is warranted in exercising control over the agency.
As noted, there is nothing in the authorizing statute on its face that sug-
gests the voucher program was driven by intentional discrimination
against students with disabilities. Participating private schools are
required to admit all students without regard to their disability status,
and once accepted, "to offer ... those services to assist students with
special needs that it can provide with minor adjustments."' 69 As detailed
above, these standards are consistent with OCR precedent and the limits
of Title H. ACLU did not offer, and DOJ did not cite, any evidence sug-
gesting that the state has ignored disability complaints brought to its
attention or had a discriminatory intent in devising the program. 70
ACLU's primary evidence of intentional discrimination seems to be
the small number of students with disabilities who participate in the
voucher program, which it contends has created a segregated system of
education in Wisconsin.' 7' ACLU estimates that students with disabilities
comprise only 1.6% of the population in private school versus the 19.5%
that are reportedly present in MPS. 72 It is unlikely, however, that such
data is factually or legally sufficient to establish that intentional dis-
crimination is taking place. First, it is unclear whether these numbers
accurately reflect the participation of children with disabilities in these
programs. A recent study conducted by academics from several univer-
sities "estimate[s] that between 7.5% and 14.6% of MPCP students have
disabilities that likely would qualify them for special education services
were they attending Milwaukee Public Schools."' 73 The study concludes
169. Evers, supra note 25, at 4.
170. See generally Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1; Complaint, supra note 28.
171. Mark W. Sherman. Complaint About Voucher Program Becomes Battle of Numbers.
LPR PUBLICArONS (Jun. 15, 2011), available at www.specialedconnection.com.
172. Complaint, supra note 28, at 10.
173. Patrick J. Wolf et al., When Rights, Incentives, and Institutions All Clash: The Case of
School Vouchers And Special Education in Milwaukee, APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper 2, 22
(Aug. 2012), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=2107763.
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that the reported numbers are artificially low because private schools
have no financial incentive to identify students with special needs, are
less formalized than their public school counterparts, and resist attach-
ing labels to students.174 Complainants' data also conflicts with a 2007
survey conducted by the School Choice Demonstration Project at the
University of Arkansas, which concluded that 9% of participating chil-
dren have disabilities of some kind.
Even if ACLU is correct, this disparity in participation does not nec-
essarily indicate that discrimination has occurred on a widespread basis.
Placement decisions for children with disabilities are highly complex
and based on numerous factors. Although the statutory language of Title
II and Section 504 regulations speaks of providing equally effective ben-
efits for students with disabilities in state programs, students in voucher
programs are placed in private schools that are subject to different stan-
dards than their public counterparts. Private schools have never been
required to provide the same levels of service and benefits as public
schools, as reflected by the diminished obligations placed upon public
accommodations in Title III and in the regulations to Section 504. If the
level of intervention a student needs exceeds the "minor adjustment"
standards under Section 504, or mandates a policy change that would
fundamentally alter the program as it exists under Title IL,11' it is not dis-
criminatory as a matter of law for a private school to refuse to serve that
child, nor surprising that parents would choose to keep their child with-
in the public education system. This highly unsatisfactory reality is one
reason why some scholars, including this author, have concluded that
voucher programs are ill-advised as a matter of public policy for stu-
dents with disabilities.'76 It is not, however, a sufficient basis on which to
support federal intervention. Notably, the voucher program is not unique
in benefitting a limited number of students with disabilities. This is true
of a number of popular public school programs, like gifted and talented
programs and interscholastic athletics, which will inevitably exclude
children with disabilities disproportionately. For some, there may be
few, if any modifications that will enable them to meet the legitimate
programmatic requirements in place.
In the absence of meaningful evidence of discriminatory intent by the
state, ACLU's complaint rises or falls on its ability to establish that the
174. Id. at 8, 10, 15.
175.42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2014), 34 C.F.R. § 104.39 (2015).
176. See Hensel, supra note 7. at 327.
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voucher program has a disparate impact on students with disabilities.
The legal measure of this question is the "meaningful access" standard
established by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of Alexander v.
Choate.'7 There, the plaintiffs challenged a Medicaid plan that imposed
a fourteen-day annual limit on Medicaid-covered hospitalization. The
plaintiffs argued that such limitations were not equally effective for, and
would have a disparate impact on, people with disabilities because of
their greater need for health care. 78 As such, these limitations violated
the Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination provision.
The Supreme Court, however, was unpersuaded. The Court began its
analysis by recognizing that "[a]ny interpretation of § 504 must ... be
responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need
to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504
within manageable bounds."'79 It reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act
requires people with disabilities to be "provided with meaningful
access" to the benefits offered by the state."" It does not, however,
require the state to offer substantively different benefits to individuals
with disabilities simply because they have a greater need for them.'81 The
Court reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act "seeks to assure evenhanded
treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate
in and benefit from programs receiving federal assistances ... [it] does
not . . guarantee the handicapped equal results.' 8 - Because the
Medicaid provision did "not invoke criteria that have a particular exclu-
sionary effect on the handicapped... [and did] not distinguish between
those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not
on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a class
are less capable of meeting or less likely of having," the Court upheld the
restriction.' 3
177. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). The Supreme Court assumed, without
deciding, that Section 504 "reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustified disparate impact
upon the handicapped." Id. at 299. Notably, the legislative history to the ADA cited Choate as the
"definitive interpretation of section 504 that [Congress] intended to copy." See also Mark C.
Weber. Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM.
&MAY L. REv. 1089, 1114 (1995).
178. Choate, 469 U.S. at 290.
179. Id. at 299.
180. Id. at 301.
181. See id. at 303-04.
182. Id. at 304.
183. Id. at 302.
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As Choate makes apparent, the inquiry under Section 504 is not
whether individuals with disabilities will equally benefit from a pro-
gram, but instead whether meaningful access to the program has been
provided.'m Neither Title II nor Section 504 require states to provide sub-
stantively different services to individuals with disabilities even if they
have a need for those services.,, By this logic, Wisconsin would seem to
have met the meaningful access standard adopted by the Court. The
service provided by the state is the provision of vouchers to students
attending private school; as detailed above, it is not a delegation of the
education function of the state. MPCP participants with disabilities, like
the Medicaid recipients, have equal access to the program based on its
terms of eligibility-participating schools must accept all applicants
without regard to their disability status. As a result, although some stu-
dents with disabilities ultimately may be unable to benefit from vouch-
ers because they have more complex educational needs than the private
schools must support, the need for additional services does not create a
cognizable claim under Section 504.86 This is analogous to the result
reached by the court in Liberty Resources Inc. discussed above, which
addressed Title II's application to a housing voucher program.' 7
Although the court acknowledged that there was insufficient accessible
housing to serve the needs of people with disabilities in the program, it
nevertheless concluded the agency had provided meaningful access to
the benefits of vouchers by providing evenhanded treatment and uniform
access. 8
For students with disabilities to benefit equally in any voucher pro-
gram, states would either have to mandate that participating schools pro-
vide services equivalent to those offered by the public schools or offer
such services directly as if the students remained enrolled in public edu-
cation. In fact, this is essentially what the DOJ has required of Wisconsin
by requiring the state "to make reasonable modifications to school poli-
cies where ADA regulations apply to DPI or public schools" and "mon-
itor[] and supervis[e] the manner in which participating schools serve
184. Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d 588, 640-41
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted).
185. Id.
186. Cf. Mary Crossley, Giving Meaning to "Meaningful Access" in Medicaid Managed
Care, 102 Ky. L.J. 255, 275 (2014) (making a related argument in the context of mandatory
enrollment in managed care).
187. Liberty Res.. Inc., v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 528 F. Supp.2d 533, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
188. Id. at 569-70.
Spring 2015]
228 Journal of Law & Education
students with disabilities."'1 89 Although there are significant policy rea-
sons to support such action, Wisconsin's exertion of control over private
schools at this level most likely would constitute a fundamental alter-
ation of its voucher program.
As currently construed, the state is responsible for providing funds to
participating children and their parents, who then determine where to
enroll. The state's control over schools is limited to ensuring their com-
pliance with a handful of administrative requirements dictated by the
state.'' This control is minimal in comparison to that dictated by the
DOJ-state oversight over admissions eligibility, discipline, and modifi-
cations to academic programs in these schools. Decisions in this realm
can be highly complex, circumstantial, and nuanced when students with
disabilities are involved. As complainants themselves acknowledge, "[a]
court's determination of whether or not an individual is a 'qualified indi-
vidual with a disability' is a fact-intensive inquiry related to the extent of
accommodations necessary."' 9' There often are no simple answers to
whether discrimination has occurred even among individuals acting in
good faith. The exercise of such control necessarily would require a sig-
nificant expenditure of resources and increase in administrative man-
power at a level not contemplated by the current program. Such require-
ments, even if advisable in many respects, are simply beyond the author-
ity provided to the agency under federal law.
VII. CONCLUSION
States can require private schools participating in their voucher pro-
grams to comply with federal antidiscrimination provisions aimed at
state actors. The federal government likewise has the authority to impose
standards on private schools in excess of Title III by passing legislation
to this effect. In the case of Wisconsin's Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program, however, neither actor has chosen to do so. The DOJ cannot
achieve this same result by holding states responsible for private school-
s' failure to comply with antidiscrimination provisions imposed upon the
state. At the end of the day, civil rights statutes are creatures of the leg-
islature. Their scope is limited to the authority delegated by the written
189. Letter from Jonathan Fischbach, supra note 1, at 3.
190. See generally Jackson v. Benson. 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (Wis. 1998).
191. Complaint. supra note 28, at 31.
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word. No matter how compelling the interest, the absence of statutory
authority results in the absence of corrective action.
If, as seems likely, some participating private schools are engaging in
discrimination against students with disabilities, then the DOJ can and
should directly investigate such behavior and take appropriate corrective
action under Title i1 or Section 504, where applicable.'" It is imperative
that federal civil rights laws are enforced in a way that ensures that chil-
dren with disabilities are protected to the maximum extent possible. If
the DOJ cannot do so because the schools in which students enroll are
non-secular and receive no federal funding, then Congress has dictated
that such actions are simply unreviewable by the federal government.
For this reason, the best actors to address discrimination in voucher pro-
grams are the states rather than federal enforcement agencies.
Advocates in Wisconsin and other states involved in voucher pro-
grams would be best served by directly pressuring state legislators to
expand the protections offered to students with disabilities in these pro-
grams. Whether or not federal law requires such action, it is indisputable
that children with disabilities deserve the chance to participate fully in
publicly funded educational programs. It is incredible, for example, that
Wisconsin law does not require participating schools to provide any
information on children with disabilities receiving vouchers. Private
schools are subject to reporting requirements in other areas, and such
information is essential both for the state to ensure nondiscrimination in
its program and for parents of children with disabilities to make good
placement decisions for their children. Although the absence of state
regulation is a hallmark of many voucher programs, this very quality
insulates poor behavior by participating schools that is simply unaccept-
able. By urging changes to the voucher programs directly rather than
through third-party intervention, advocates can shed light on and more
readily improve the ways in which their states serve students with dis-
abilities.
192. 28 CFR § 36.502(a) (2015); Memorandum from Michael L. Williams, Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to OCR Senior Staff, 19 IDELR 889 (1992). See
also, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Sues Nobel
Learning Communities Inc. for Discrimination Against Children with Disabilities (Apr. 29,
2009). available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-nobel-Iearning-
communities-inc-discrimination-against-children.
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